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A COMPARISON OF SOME RIVAL MODELS*
James J. Whitet
Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code authorizes a con-
tract seller to allocate goods in short supply when full performance
has become commercially impracticable.' Most of the cases under
and commentary on that section have focused on the issue of
commercial impracticability. The allocation aspects of the section
have attracted much more modest attention in the cases and in the
scholarly journals.
The purpose of this article is to examine critically the allocation
rule set out in section 2-615(b). That subsection authorizes a seller,
upon a finding of commercial impracticability, to allocate "in any
manner which is fair and reasonable." By reference to a series of
sources I propose to give meaning to the "fair and reasonable"
language, to examine alternative modes of allocation under that
language, and to suggest the reasons and policies that might cause a
seller to choose one mode over another and that should cause a
court to direct that one or another method of allocation be fol-
lowed.
My thesis in this article is threefold: first that the courts' general
refusal to overturn most sellers' allocation plans has been a wise
decision; second that a variety of appropriate reasons cause the
typical seller to use a largely pro rata allocation plan; third that re-
ference both to the common law history and to non-common law
methods of allocation within the Code and under the federal ad-
ministrative agencies gives some insight about the rare case in
which a court should disapprove a proposed allocation plan and
about the safeguards that need to be set up for a seller who would
deviate from a pro rata allocation scheme.
*This article was stimulated by research into the allocation process in the chemical industry
during the shortage of 1974 and following. I intend to follow this article with a discussion of the
allocation methods which were used in the chemical industry.
tAssociate Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A., 1956,
Amherst College; J.D., 1962, University of Michigan.
Professor White wishes to thank Douglas Mo, Stewart Schwab, and Elise Singer, all class of
1980, for their research assistance in the preparation of this article.
U.C.C. § 2-615(b) reads as follows:
Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller's
capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries among his custom-
ers but may at his option include regular customers not then under contract as well
as his own requirements for future manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner
which is fair and reasonable.
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I. ALLOCATION AT COMMON LAW - THE PRO RATA MODEL
Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century there have
been several episodes of allocation litigation. Each of these
episodes corresponds with some disruption of the economy such as
war, labor strife,2 and, more recently, the Arab oil embargo. The
earliest comprehensive discussion grew out of the shipment of coal
from Maryland to Massachusetts during the Civil War. 3 Episodes
which also involved coal arose around the turn of the century and
during World War I. 4 The need for products such as sulphuric acid
to produce ammunition during World War I produced another
series of cases. 5 Finally are the petroleum products cases produced
by the Oil Embargo of 1973 and attendant market disruptions. 6
For the purpose of this Section, I limit consideration to the cases
in which the seller of goods has failed to deliver contracted-for
quantities and has argued in a lawsuit between itself and the buyer
that seller has discharged its responsibility by prorating or by some
other allocation scheme. I thus exclude cases that involve prora-
tion under insurance contracts 7 or prorations of the kinds dis-
cussed below under Article 9 s or under federal standards. 9
In the earliest case, Oakman v. Boyce, 10 an 1868 Massachusetts
case, the contract called for delivery of 5,000 tons of "Franklin"
"Run of Mine" coal on board at Baltimore at $6.00. It was signed
early in April of 1864 and, by usage of trade, provided for the deliv-
ery "from time to time as purchasers might need it, during the
shipping season, which lasted to the end of the year." The defen-
dant shipped only "several hundred tons" under the contract. Ul-
timately he argued that he was excused from his obligation for sub-
2 Metropolitan Coal Co. v. E. F. Billings, 202 Mass. 457, 89 N.E. 115 (1909) (strike of
miners in Pennsylvania interrupted supply of coal).
3 Oakman v. Boyce, 100 Mass. 477 (1868).
4 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Peninsular Portland Cement Co., 272 F. 625 (6th Cir. 1921);
Luhrig Coal Co. v. Jones & Adams Co, 141 F. 617 (6th Cir. 1905); Jessup & Moore Paper Co.
v. Piper, 133 F. 108 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1902).
5 Acme Mfg. Co. v. Arminius Chem. Co., 264 F. 27 (4th Cir. 1920) (shortage of sulphur
pyrites, an ingredient in gun power); Davison Chem. Co. v. Baugh Chem. Co., 133 Md. 203,
104 A. 404 (1918) (shortage of sulphuric acid resulting from U-boat campaign); B.P. Ducas
Co. v. Bayer Co., 163 N.Y.S. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (embargo imposed by Germany exacerbated
shortage of dye).
6 Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Terry v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 962, 140 Cal. Rptr. 510, 22 U.C.C. REP. 669 (1977) (gas station
operators challenged fairness of allocation system); Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v. Folger Gas
Co., 231 Ga. 868, 204 S.E.2d 625, 14 U.C.C. REP. 953 (1974) (propane shortage).
See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Slifkin, 200 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Ala.
1961).
s See Part III A infra.
'See Parts III B and III C infra.
10 100 Mass. 477 (1868).
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sequent deliveries because the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was
interrupted "for a short time by freshets in April" and because
there was "a serious interruption from the invasion of Maryland by
the Southern armies under General Early" during the latter part of
July. 1 1 This interruption apparently lasted until late September.
The defendant proved the other contracts made by him during
1864, the amount of coal mined and received by him, and the vari-
ous prices and dates of deliveries under the contracts.
The trial court's jury instruction is a fundamental statement of a
pro rata method of distribution that could be used today.
You are to apply that to the case of a man carrying on
the coal business, in which the other contracting party
does not expect him to perform the contract at once;
would not be satisfied if he did, but expects it to be carried
along through the season. Therefore it will be for you to
consider whether it would or would not be reasonable for
him to make other contracts than simply this one. What,
under that stipulation, would be the duty of the defendant,
and what would be his rights? Would he have a right, in
your judgment, under that state of facts, to make other
contracts than the one with the plaintiffs? Why, how could
he carry on his business otherwise? He is going to mine,
we will say, 50,000 tons. The plaintiffs are to take 5000.
They want that coal delivered along through the season as
it comes. Is he not reasonable and right, in April, in mak-
ing contracts with nine other persons for 5000 tons apiece,
expecting to supply them all along? If, then, he has come
down in the month of May 5000 tons of coal, is it or not a
reasonable and proper performance of his contract, al-
though he has enough to give the plaintiffs all their coal, if
it was then sent off, for him to deliver 500 tons to the plain-
tiffs, and 500 tons to each of the nine others, thus disposing
of five thousand tons of the whole product of the year? I
can see no reason to doubt, gentlemen, that that would be
right. And if he had customers at home, besides his con-
tracts to deliver in distant cities; if he had men who kept
little coal-yards in Baltimore, who wanted 100 tons, or rail-
roads or steamboats there, which he was accustomed to
supply, would it be reasonable, and consistent with the in-
tention of the parties and the scope of this contract, that he
should supply these customers? -that is, that he should
carry on his business just as he would if no other accident
Id.at 478-79.
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were to happen? I do not mean that he should be impru-
dent, and not keep a little ahead, as every prudent man,
having contract to fill, should do; but having made his ar-
rangements to supply all his customers, and expecting that
he would be able to supply them all, - if that was his mode
of carrying on his business, until some interruption occur-
red from some source, I shall instruct you, as matter of
law, that he would not be responsible to these plaintiffs,
simply from the fact that he may have had on hand a quan-
tity of coal sufficient to supply them with the whole 5000
tons, which he did not deliver to them, but delivered to
somebody else. That is, that upon the proof that it was not
expected nor desired he should deliver it; that it was not
intended by the parties; and is not the legal construction of
this contract, that he was to suspend all his other business
until he had performed his contract with the plaintiffs; and
that the plaintiffs' contract was obviously left open to be
performed in order with the rest of his business; and that if
he continued to perform it reasonably, until some interrup-
tion occurred which is provided for in the contract, he
would not be responsible, although he may have had coal
enough on hand to discharge it. 12
The court apparently allowed non-contract customers in the
Baltimore area, to whom the seller was "accustomed to deliver,"
to share in the pro rata distribution scheme. To that extent there is
at least implicit rejection of the proposition that one who has a con-
tract should stand on a better footing than a customary spot pur-
chaser. One wonders whether the court would have adopted some
other allocation scheme if the plaintiff had been a consumer rather
than a middle man who stood simply to lose his profit. One also
wonders whether the court would have adopted a different position
if the plaintiff had asserted some rationale based on the words of
the contract, the timing of their delivery, or the time of contracting.
In the instructions, the court assumed that all of the deliveries to all
of the contracting and non-contracting parties would be in-
terspersed. Thus if one takes the position that there should be allo-
cation based upon the time of delivery as opposed to the time of
contracting, 13 one might still arrive at the same conclusion on the
facts of this case; since each was entitled to some delivery before
the others, there had to be proration.
12 Id. at 479-81.
I3 It is not apparent from the case that the buyer gave any reason why he should have
priority over any other claimant. There is no suggestion that his contract was made before
others or that the terms of his contract differed from those of any other contracting party.
[VOL. 12:3
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The jury found for the defendant and that finding was affirmed
on appeal. 1 4 The appellate court squarely faced the question who
among three possible parties should enjoy the profit that resulted
from a substantial rise in price: the Boston buyer, Maryland seller,
or all buyers pro rata? 1 5 In effect the court held that the
defendant-seller satisfied his obligation by pro rata distribution of
the available supply.
In a second widely cited nineteenth century case, McKeefrey v.
Connellsville Coke and Iron, Co.,1 6 a Pennsylvania court recog-
nized the propriety of a pro rata distribution system in a case in-
volving the sale of coke. The shortage was not of coke but of rail
cars to deliver the coke. Adopting a pro rata scheme with prefer-
ence for carloads sent to blast furnaces over foundries, the court
relied in part on the custom in the trade. 17 As in Oakman v. Boyce,
the court explicitly rejected the defendant's argument that he
should have had priority and should have received 100% of his de-
liveries before certain others received any of their deliveries; the
court described such a priority system as "destructive to the
trade."' 8 Exactly what the court meant by the quoted phrase is
14 The appellate court stated as follows:
The jury were cautioned that this apportionment by the defendant should be
made fairly and in entire good faith; that he had no right to deprive the plaintiffs of
their full proportion of the supply from the mines, for the sake of obtaining a larger
price by sales to other parties, nor by new contracts or sales not in the course of his
usual and ordinary business, after the cause of deficiency happened.
Id. at 486.
' The plaintiffs had apparently argued that since the defendant admittedly had 5,000 tons
on hand during the year and since they had a contract for delivery of 5,000 tons, ipso facto
the defendant was liable for his failure to deliver. Although the court did not state plaintiffs'
claim for damages, the instruction by the lower court specified that the plaintiffs had a claim
for "a very large amount of money" and had
... lost the opportunity to put into their pockets a profit of somewhere from 15-
20,000 dollars, according to the testimony, as they might have sold their coal
sooner or later, as prices went up. It is undoubtedly a great disappointment to men
to lose such an amount as that; in looking at it from the plaintiff's side of the case,
they having made a contract which they hoped would be obligatory and would
bring the coal, and having made it in the hope of realizing some profit, when it
turned out that, if performed, as they expected and intended it should be, it would
have given them a very great profit, its non-fulfillment was undoubtedly a great
disappointment to them, and they would be glad to get as much of that sum as the
jury shall find they are entitled to.
Id. at 483-84. On appeal the plaintiff apparently argued to the judge that the instruction just
quoted had "unfairly prejudiced the minds of the jury towards them, by representing their
claim in the light of a gambling speculation." Id. at 486.
16 56 F. 212 (3d Cir. 1893).
I ld. at 215-16.
18
The contention that the plaintiff should have supplied them with all the cars re-
ceived from the railroad company, up to the required number, and if not, that a
distribution should have been made upon the basis of the orders on hand at the date
of the contract, is not only against common usage, as we have seen, but is unrea-
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unclear. Perhaps the court had concluded that the idea of sharing is
so deeply ingrained in the trade that if a seller attempted to do
something else it would be boycotted by the other members of the
trade. Perhaps the court was simply concerned about the seller
who deals partly with non-contract but continuing customers and
partly with the contract customers. In such a case perhaps the
court assumed that one who did not recognize the right of a non-
contract customer to share would lose that customer. The court
apparently assumed that a priority system which gave 100% of the
coke to some and none to others would cause the other to buy
elsewhere not only during the period of shortage but also thereaf-
ter.
By the turn of the century in Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v.
Piper1 9 and Luhrig Coal Co. v. Jones & Adams Co.2 0 we see that
the idea of proration is well entrenched, at least in coal car shor-
tages. In Jessup & Moore, Judge McPherson instructed the jury to
apply a pro rata measure and rejected the idea that contract plain-
tiffs should have first call on all of the railroad cars.2 1
sonable. If sustained it would be destructive to the trade. No manufacturer could
continue his business under such a rule. To answer that parties can guard against
the danger by contracting accordingly, and that this contract is to be construed as
contended for because the usage is not written into it, does not help the defendants.
No sensible man would so contract as to destroy his business, and in contemplation
of law the usage is written into this contract.
Id. at 217.
19 133 F. 108 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1902).
20 141 F. 617 (6th Cir. 1905). The allocation scheme was specifically incorporated into the
contract in a somewhat inartful way:
(6) The party of the second part shall use every reasonable effort to secure suffi-
cient cars for the shipment to the party of the first part of all the coal called for by
this contract, and if it fails to secure sufficient cars to do so, it agrees to load and
deliver to the party of the first part a part of the cars it may receive in the propor-
tion that the coal called for under this contract each day bears to the total produc-
tion of coal from the mines of the party of the second part for suchday.
Id. at 619.
21
It is at that point that we approach the question of fact that is to be submitted for
your determination--that is, the allegation upon the part of the defendants that they
did not have sufficient cars to enable them to fulfill their contracts, and therefore
that they did the next best thing; that is to say, they apportioned their cars among
all their customers, giving to each one his due and ratable share. If the facts were as
averred by the defendants, I think that would be a fair, a reasonable, and proper
thing to do. I do not think the defendants could be called upon to carry out one
contract in full at the expense of all the other contracts for which they were equally
bound, but that if there was a genuine scarcity of cars, so that it was impossible for
them, for example, to carry out more than twenty-five per cent. of their contracts, if
they carried out twenty-five per cent. of each contract I think that would be per-
fectly fair and proper and lawful to do, under such a contract as lies before us.
133 F. 108, 110 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1902).
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By the time of the 1916 coal car shortages, and somewhat later
World War I shortages of "pyrites," 22 the doctrine of proration had
ample authority both in the custom and in the cases. Although the
court in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Peninsular Portland Cement
Co. was again referring to a shortage of coal cars, its statement
could have a broader application:
Plaintiff, as a purchaser of coal in large amounts, can
scarcely be presumed to have thought that its contract was
the only one defendant had, especially as the amount
plaintiff contracted for was only 1 per cent of defendant's
total output for each of the three preceeding years-in
fact, the ratio was even less during the year here in ques-
tion. The possibility of car shortage is universally recog-
nized.23
In two cases involving contracts for "pyrites" or sulphuric acid
during World War I, the courts in Acme Manufacturing v. Arminius
Chemical Co.2 4 and Davison Chemical Co. v. Baugh Chemical
Co .5 recognized the right of a seller to allocate on a pro rata basis
when it has an appropriate excuse. The price per unit of sulphur
during the period of those contracts increased from 9 cents to ap-
proximately 25 cents per unit. Courts in both Acme Manufacturing
and Davison Chemical looked with a jaundiced eye upon the sell-
er's argument that it had acted in good faith in prorating its short
supply. Although both accepted the legitimacy of the "doctrine of
prorating," each concluded that the seller had not properly pro-
rated but had in fact diverted its supply of sulphur to higher priced
non-contract uses.
Thus by the end of the second decade in the twentieth century,
the doctrine that sellers of goods should allocate in times of short-
age by prorating among existing customers was well established
and had been recognized not only in the coal trade but in chemicals
and iron. 26 Subsequent common law cases recognized the exis-
tence of the doctrine in the sale of flowers, 27 agricultural prod-
22 See Acme Mfg. Co. v. Arminius Chem. Co., 264 F. 27 (4th Cir. 1920); Davison Chem.
Co. v. Baugh Chem. Co., 133 Md. 203, 104 A. 404 (1918).
23 272 F. 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1921).
24 264 F. 27 (4th Cir. 1920).
25 133 Md. 203, 104 A. 404 (1918).
2' Acme Mfg. Co. v. Arminius Chem. Co., 264 F. 27 (4th Cir. 1920); Davison Chem. Co. v.
Baugh Chem. Co., 133 Md. 203, 104 A. 404 (1918); In re Bellevue Pipe & Foundry Co., 189 F.
169 (N.D. Ohio 1910).
27 Haley v. Van Lierop, 64 F. Supp. 114 (W.D. Mich.) affd, 153 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1945).
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ucts, 28 and cement. 29 Before the Uniform Commercial Code was
enacted, the doctrine had virtually quashed any argument against a
pro rata allocation system in such cases. Moreover, these cases
had already addressed many of the exceptions and subtleties that
one must consider in forming an appropriate pro rata scheme.
Many of the cases had dealt with the difficult question, among
whom does one prorate? In the earliest case, Oakman, ° the court
concluded that the Maryland mine owner had a right to serve his
regular and presumably non-contract "customers" in the Balti-
more market and to prorate among them along with the contract
customer from Boston. The court in Jessup & Moore 3 held that
one could not add new contracts after the shortage had arisen. It is
not clear from that case whether the court was describing persons
who might have fit the "customer" class in Oakman or whether
these were entirely new buyers. Likewise the court in Acme3 2 held
that one should not add new customers at a time when the sulphur
prices had radically increased and the seller was either unable or
unwilling to meet its contract obligations. In such cases the courts
were well aware that the seller was likely to serve its selfish inter-
ests by allocating larger than pro rata amounts to spot buyers or
others who would pay at a new and presumably radically elevated
shortage price. Perhaps in an over-reaction to that fear, the court in
Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal & Coke Co. 
33
held that one who had bought another's mines could not prorate to
the old customers of those mines. It is unclear from the decision
whether the court referred to the output of the purchased mines
themselves or only to output of all mines owned by the buyer. If it
was characterizing the output of the purchased mines themselves,
the case seems wrong. Likewise the courts in Davison Chemical
34
rejected the defendant's argument that it had a right to prorate to
new customers who were added in the prospect of enlarged
facilities. The court intimated that the very attempt to enlarge the
facility was the cause for the shortage.
Thus in one way or another, most of the proration plans recog-
28 County of Yuba v. Mattoon, 160 Cal. App. 2d 456, 325 P.2d 162 (1958) (required to pro-
rate crop among lessors when crop limited by government order); Akins v. Riverbank Can-
ning Co., 80 Cal. App. 2d 868, 183 P.2d 86 (1947) (shortage of boxes for tomatoes apportioned
among growers); Ranney-Davis Mercantile Co. v. Shawano Canning Co., 111 Kan. 68, 206 P.
337 (1922) (unfavorable weather caused a poor crop of beans and beets); Clay Grocery Co. v.
Kenyon Canning Corp., 198 Minn. 533, 270 N.W. 590 (1936) (drought resulting in shortage of
corn).
29 Amsden Lumber Co. v. Stanton, 132 Kan. 91, 294 P. 853 (1931).
30 100 Mass. 477 (1868).
31 133 F. 108 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1902).
32 264 F. 27 (4th Cir. 1920).
33 199 Mass. 22, 84 N.E. 1020 (1908).
34 133 Md. 203, 104 A. 404 (1918).
[VOL. 12:3
HeinOnline  -- 12 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 510 1978-1979
Allocation of Scarce Resources
nized that there was a limited class entitled to proration and that
those not within the class were to be excluded entirely from the
seller's output. Some explicitly recognized the seller's right to allo-
cate to non-contract customers. The facts of some of the other
cases are not clear; perhaps regular customers were excluded from
allocation schemes in some of those.
In addition the cases reveal consideration of a few of the more
subtle problems that are present today in a basic pro rata allocation
scheme. For example, the McKeefrey court acknowledged, appar-
ently with approval, the custom in the coke trade to give priority to
blast furnace use of coke over foundry use of coke.
3 5
Likewise we see the courts beginning to wrestle with the ques-
tion of the basis of the proration. In McKeefrey, for example, the
allocation was made not on the basis of actual production of the
buyers but on "oven capacity." 3 6 One who thinks about it for a
moment will realize that the label "proration" covers a wide vari-
ety of possible systems. For example, one might prorate based
upon deliveries over an historic period, upon contract amounts
during the current period, or upon current needs. By choosing the
basis for proration, one can substantially favor one customer over
another without deviating from a general pro rata scheme.
II. THE CASES UNDER SECTION 2-615-PRO RATA ALLOCATION
CONTINUED
Section 2-615's allocation scheme rests squarely on the cases de-
scribed above. One can see elements of those cases both in the lan-
guage of the section and the comments under section 2-615.
Subsection (b) reads in full as follows:
Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only
a part of the seller's capacity to perform, he must allocate
production and deliveries among his customers but may at
his option include regular customers not then under con-
tract as well as his own requirements for further manufac-
ture. He may so allocate in any manner which is fair and
reasonable.
It is conceivable that one could establish an allocation scheme
that would give 100% to one class, a lesser percentage to another
and yet fit within the obligation to allocate in "fair and reasonable"
method. However, in light of the history recounted above and of
the comments it seems likely that the drafters visualized some form
35 56 F. 212. 213-14 (3rd Cir. 1893).
36 Id. at 214.
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of pro rata system when they authorized a "fair and reasonable"
allocation method.
Comment 11 of section 2-615 uses the verb "prorate," and, more
clearly than the section itself, contemplates a proration scheme as
the typical one. The seller is admonished in the first sentence to
"take account of all in supplying one." In the next to the last sen-
tence, the seller is told that, "in case of doubt [one's] contract cus-
tomers should be favored and supplies prorated evenly among [the
customers] regardless of price." 3 7 Thus the most plausible reading
of section 2-615(b) is that it calls for a proration method as the basic
allocation scheme, but that it does not rule out some, perhaps sub-
stantial, deviations from a pro rata scheme.
There are only four post-Code allocation cases under section
2-615. Three are energy crisis cases; one involves the allocation of
new cars by General Motors. All are unremarkable.
In the first case, Mansfield Propane Gas Co., Inc. v. Folger Gas
Co. ," the trial court found that the Uniform Commercial Code did
not apply and held that the seller of propane gas had to give full
deliveries to its contract customer at the expense of other non-
contract customers. On appeal the Georgia court reversed and sent
the case back with instructions to provide for a fair and reasonable
allocation.3 9 In Cecil Corley Motors Co., Inc. v. General Motors
Corp. ,40 the court was relieved of any obligation to examine the
General Motors Pontiac division allocation scheme when the plain-
tiff failed to prove that it had placed any orders for cars that the
Pontiac division had not filled.41
Of somewhat more interest are the two cases that involved the
37 The comment reads in full as follows:
An excused seller must fulfill his contract to the extent which the supervening
contingency permits, and if the situation is such that his customers are generally
affected he must take account of all in supplying one. Subsections (a) and (b),
therefore, explicitly permit in any proration a fair and reasonable attention to the
needs of regular customers who are probably relying on spot orders for supplies.
Customers at different stages of the manufacturing process may be fairly treated by
including the seller's manufacturing requirements. A fortiori, the seller may also
take account of contracts later in date than the one in question. The fact that such
spot orders may be closed at an advanced price causes no difficulty, since any allo-
cation which exceeds normal past requirements will not be reasonable. However,
good faith requires, when prices have advanced, that the seller exercise real care in
making his allocations, and in case of doubt his contract customers should be fa-
vored and supplies prorated evenly among them regardless of price. Save for the
extra care thus required by changes in the market, this section seeks to leave every
reasonable business leeway to the seller.
U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 11 (1972 version).
38 Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v. Folger Gas Co., 231 Ga. 868, 204 S.E.2d 625, 14 U.C.C.
REP. 953 (1974).
39 Id. at 871, 204 S.E.2d at 628, 14 U.C.C. REP. at 957.
40 Cecil Corley Motor Co. Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819 (M.D. Tenn.
1974).
4 Id. at 835.
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Atlantic Richfield Company, Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. 42 and Terry v. Atlantic Richfield Co.43 In each of those cases,
gasoline station operators, an Atlantic Richfield Co. franchisee and
an independent operator, challenged the Atlantic Richfield Co. al-
location scheme that was in effect in 1973. As it was applied in the
Philadelphia area, the court reports the scheme as follows:
"Until further notice, our sales of gasoline to you begin-
ning June 1, 1973, will be limited to (104%) of our sales to
you during the comparable calendar month of 1972, except
in those cases where a different basis is approved due to
such factors as the lack of 1972 sales history or the occur-
rence of a material intervening event. Any amount avail-
able to you in any month cannot be carried over to the suc-
ceeding month."
44
The plan illustrates how one might deal with the claims for equity
of various people in a pro rata allocation scheme, and it illustrates
some of the complexities that are inevitably involved with such a
plan. Note, for example, the last sentence which prohibits car-
ryovers, an issue present in almost every pro rata scheme.
Moreover, the Atlantic Richfield Co. scheme had alternative rules
for those who could fit them:
"In the event a base month is determined to have been
adversely affected by a natural and non-recurring event
(e.g., traffic disruption, reconstruction, temporary clo-
sure, etc.), Region or Zone Managers may approve an al-
ternate basis which shall be an average of the nearest pre-
ceding and successive full month on each side of the period
of interruption. ",
45
In each of the Atlantic Richfield Co. cases the plaintiffs presented a
variety of allegations. In the Philadelphia case the buyer alleged
that Atlantic Richfield Co. was conspiring with the buyer's regular
non-discount dealers to freeze it out of the market. In the Califor-
nia case the franchisee argued that his was a hardship case because
he had opened his station in 1971 and thus should have had some
other form of proration than one based on 1972 sales when he was
relatively new in the business. The California court affirmed the
summary judgment of the trial court in Atlantic Richfield Co.'s
favor; the court in Philadelphia declined to grant the plaintiff an in-
junction. In effect it allowed the Atlantic Richfield Co.'s allocation
42 364 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
4 72 Cal. App. 3d 962, 140 Cal. Rptr. 510, 22 U.C.C. REP. 669 (1977).
4 Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82, 90 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
s Id. at 91.
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scheme to stand until the conclusion of the suit.
None of the post-Code cases add much to the pre-Code cases.
They seem simply to continue the policy set out in the earlier
cases. Note that virtually every one of the cases recognizes some
form of proration. However, several of the cases recognize that
there may be certain priority rules. For example in McKeefrey 46
the court stated that blast furnaces could have first priority, and the
Atlantic Richfield cases47 recognize and approve the appropriate-
ness of deviation from pro rata in certain circumstances, as when
the allocatee is not in operation during the historic allocation
period. In only four out of twenty-one cases did the courts strike
down allocation schemes. 48 From the earliest times there has ap-
peared to be a judicial willingness to give the seller a considerable
degree of discretion.
III. ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION MODELS
A. Article 9-Priority By Agreement
The most explicit, comprehensive, and widely-used allocation
scheme in the Uniform Commercial Code is not contained in Arti-
cle 2 nor is it addressed in the contract allocation cases. Rather it is
the system of priorities among secured creditors and between se-
cured creditors and others that is set out in Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Section 9-201 states the basic principle of Arti-
cle 9, that a security agreement "is effective according to its terms
between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and
against creditors." In other words, if one creditor has a security
interest in personal property, that creditor has a right fully to
satisfy itself out of that collateral before the collateral is used to
satisfy even one penny of the interest of purchasers or the other
creditors. Section 9-301 subordinates that interest to the claims of
certain other parties when it is not "perfected," and section 9-312
states what the basic rule of allocation is among perfected secured
creditors. The basic subsection is 5(a) which reads in part, "con-
flicting security interests rank according to priority in time of filing
" McKeefrey v. Connellsville Coke & Iron Co., 56 F. 212 (3rd Cir. 1893).
'1 Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Terry v. Atlan-
tic Richfield Co., 72 Cal. App. 2d 962, 140 Cal. Rptr. 510, 22 U.C.C. REP. 669 (1977).
48 The four are: Acme Mfg. Co. v. Arminius Chem. Co., 264 F. 27 (4th Cir. 1920); Haley v.
Van Lierop, 64 F. Supp. 114 (W.D. Mich.), aff d, 153 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1945); Akins v. River-
bank Canning Co., 80 Cal. App. 2d 868, 183 P.2d 86 (1947); B.P. Ducas v. Bayer Co., 163
N.Y.S. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1916). Cf. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Peninsular Portland Cement Co.,
272 F. 625 (6th Cir. 1921) (although the allocation scheme was not struck down on appeal, the
opinion suggests that it would be found unfair on remand).
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or perfection. . . ." Finally section 9-504(1) 49 makes it plain that a
secured creditor with priority over another is to be fully satisfied
before any money goes to any subordinate creditor.
The common law of creditors' rights, ignoring bankruptcy, pro-
vides for a complete satisfaction of the creditor with the highest
priority before any payment is made to subordinate creditors.
50
Thus the creditor who either first achieves payment from the
debtor or who first acquires a lien or first takes some other judicial
action under the state law to validate its rights wins all. In all of
these cases the senior party is fully satisfied before the junior par-
ties receive a penny. Typically the court's responsibility is only to
rank the parties.
Under Article 9, priority generally goes to the creditor who first
filed a public notice of its security claim. The Article contains an
extensive and complex set of rules about what one must file and
where one must file it.51 Depending upon the type of collateral, the
residence of the debtor, and where the collateral is to be used, the
Code gives the creditor directions to file in one state or another and
within the state to file at the county level or the state capitol as the
case may be. The function of such public notice provisions is to put
subsequent parties on notice to prevent the debtor from causing a
second diligent lender to give it money in the belief that lender will
have a first claim. Absent some method of giving notice to sub-
sequent parties, we can not tolerate an agreed priority system. 52
B. Allocation of Natural Gas by the Federal Power
Commission-Priority by Fiat
The most widely used, non-UCC statutory allocation schemes
" U.C.C. § 9-504(1) reads as follows:
A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of
the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable prep-
aration or processing. Any sale of goods is subject to the Article on Sales (Article
2). The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the order following to
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease, sell-
ing, leasing and the like and, to the extent provided for in the agreement and
not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses in-
curred by the secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest under which
the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security interest
in the collateral if written notification of demand therefor is received before
distribution of the proceeds is completed. If requested by the secured party,
the holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably furnish reason-
able proof of his interest, and unless he does so, the secured party need not
comply with his demand.
5o See generally Storke, An Introduction to Security, 16 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 27 (1943).
51 See U.C.C. §§ 9-103, 9-401, 9-402 (1972 version).
52 See G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 462-80 (1965).
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cover petroleum products and natural gas. In the public's mind,
there is confusion between the two schemes. Although there is an
interrelationship between the problems, to a substantial degree
they are separate, are regulated by separate agencies, and result
from shortages brought on by different causes. As early as 1970,
some natural gas distribution companies had operating allocation
schemes.5 These schemes had been established more than two
years prior to the Arab Oil Embargo in response to a shortage of
natural gas wholly unrelated to the ultimate rise in price of petrole-
um products that followed the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973.
To understand the original allocation plan it is necessary to know
something about the natural gas industry. Broadly, the industry
can be divided into three groups: the producers, the transporters,
and the retailers. The producers are those who drill for natural gas,
bring it out of the ground, and sell it to someone who will transport
it to the market. The transporters are the pipeline companies who
buy the gas in Texas or elsewhere and transport it through their
pipelines to the retail markets. The retailers are the utilities.5 4 The
interstate pipeline companies were subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) (now under the Department of
Energy). 55 It is that Commission that has fixed prices since the
mid-fifties and more recently has set out plans that will allocate
natural gas in times of shortage.
5 6
Although the FPC's power to establish allocation systems was
not entirely clear, 57 various companies began to apply for approval
of their curtailment plans in the early 1970's.58 The upshot of these
applications was a debate in the industry about the utility of a pro
rata versus a priority system. 59 Ultimately the FPC passed Rule
'3 See, e.g., Federal Power Commission Oversight - Natural Gas Curtailment Priorities:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-43 (1974).
U, See, e.g., M. WILLRICH, ADMINISTRATION OF ENERGY SHORTAGES 14-24 (1976).
55 15 U.S.C., § 717(b) (1976).
56 Order No. 467, 49 F.P.C. 85 (1973), codified in 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1978); Order No. 431, 45
F.P.C. 570 (1971), codified in 18 C.F.R. § 2.70 (1978).
5' M. WILLRICH, supra note 54, at 49.
58 El Paso Natural Gas Co., 48 F.P.C. 931 (1972); United Gas Pipe Line Co., 46 F.P.C. 786
(1971).
19 In response to their inquiries, the Senate Committee on Commerce received statements
advocating both a pro rata approach and the end-use approach advocated by the FPC. A
spokesman for the Piedmont Natural Gas Company supported his argument for pro rata al-
location by stating:
The fairest system for allocating natural gas is a pro rata percentage of contract
volumes. Only on a pro rata curtailment of contract entitlements can communities
and gas companies be encouraged to engage in self-help measures including synthe-
tic natural gas plants and conservation. The FPC's end-use curtailment discrimin-
ates between regions of the country as shown in the table below :
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467-B, which gives top priority to residential users together with
small commercial users; it gives lowest priority to users capable of
burning other fuels who used more than 10 million cubic feet of
natural gas per day. The rule now appears in the Code of Federal
Regulations in part as follows:
(a)(1) The national interests in the development and
utilization of natural gas resources throughout the United
States will be served by recognition and implementation of
the following priority-of-service categories for use during
periods of curtailed deliveries by jurisdictional pipeline
companies:
(i) Residential, small commercial (less than 50 Mcf on a
peak day).
(In percent)
1974-75 Winter 1975 Summer
467-B Pro rata 467-B Pro rata
Mississippi .......................... 9.59 25.77 7.72 34.54
Alabama ............................ 30.72 25.77 29.53 34.54
Georgia ............................. 30.27 25.77 23.02 34.54
North Carolina ...................... 38.25 25.77 46.10 34.54
South Carolina ....................... 42.99 25.77 46.68 34.54
Virginia ............................. 32.98 25.77 36.53 34.54
District of Columbia .................. 16.37 25.77 15.46 34.54
Maryland-Delaware .................. 23.98 25.77 31.62 34.54
Pennsylvania ........................ 19.53 25.77 24.46 34.54
New Jersey ......................... 21.73 25.77 30.05 34.54
New York ........................... 19.35 25.77 40.30 34.54
(Source: Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation supplies, taken from Exhibit
No. 116, FPC Docket No. RP72-99).
An advocate for the FPC approach of allocation based on end-use, National Economic
Research Associates, Inc., arrived at its position by reasoning:-
First, as to actual allocations in a critical shortage period, where hardship is
threatened: the best rule to follow is to give priority to the users who are least able
to convert to the use of other fuels, in the short run. A residence with a gas furnace
cannot burn oil in that furnace; installation of oil equipment is expensive (relative
to the annual fuel bill) and, on a wholesale basis, the shift is probably not practica-
ble. Similarly, gas cooking equipment, in homes and in commercial establishments,
would have to be completely replaced if gas were not available. The same is true for
some industrial uses. At the other end of the scale it is possible in many industrial
installations (including power plants) to convert, relatively simply and inexpen-
sively (in terms of conversion cost) to oil; and the advantages of keeping such
facilities on gas are minimal.
The second criterion which needs to be considered is the physical ability to "turn
off" or in any way limit gas supply to different segments of the user group. It is
virtually impossible, with gas supply systems presently in use, to do this for the
smaller users. Only the very large users can physically be cut off in an emergency
situation.
In the light of these two circumstances the FPC end-use curtailment priority sys-
tem under Order 467-B is about as reasonable a one as could be'devised to cope
with short-term emergency allocation problems.
Federal Power Commission Oversight - Natural Gas Curtailment Priorities: Hearings Be-
fore the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 291-92, 600 (1974).
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(ii) Large commercial requirements (50 Mcf or more on a
peak day), firm industrial requirements for plant protec-
tion, feedstock and process needs, and pipeline customer
storage injection requirements.
(ix) Interruptible requirements of more than 10,000 Mcf
per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such
requirements.
60
Obviously the document represents important judgments not only
about whether one should have a pro rata or a priority distribution
scheme but also about the relative merits of the various claims to
the scarce resource.
s0
(a)(l) The national interests in the development and utilization of natural gas re-
sources throughout the United States will be served by recognition and implemen-
tation of the following priority-of-service categories for use during periods of cur-
tailed deliveries by jurisdictional pipeline companies:
(i) Residential, small commercial (less than 50 Mcf on a peak day).
(ii) Large commercial requirements (50 Mcf or more on a peak day), firm indus-
trial requirements for plant protection, feedstock and process needs, and pipeline
customer storage injection requirements.
(iii) All industrial requirements not specified in paragraph (a)(l)(ii), (iv), (v), (vi),
(vii), (viii), or (ix) of this section.
(iv) Firm industrial requirements for boiler fuel use at less than 3,000 Mcf per
day, but more than 1,500 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet
such requirements.
(v) Firm industrial requirements for large volume (3,000 Mcf or more per day)
boiler fuel use where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(vi) Interruptible requirements of more than 300 Mcf per day, but less than 1,500
Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(vii) Interruptible requirements of intermediate volumes (from 1,500 Mcf per day
through 3,000 Mcf per day), where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such re-
quirements.
(viii) Interruptible requirements of more than 3,000 Mcf per day, but less than
10,000 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(ix) Interruptible requirements of more than 10,000 Mc per day, where alternate
fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(2) The priorities-of-deliveries set forth above will be applied to the deliveries of
all jurisdictional pipeline companies during periods of curtailment on each com-
pany's system; except, however, that, upon a finding of extraordinary cir-
cumstances after hearing initiated by a petition filed under § 1.7(b) of the Commis-
sion's rules of practice and procedure, exceptions to those priorities may be per-
mitted.
(3) The above list of priorities requires the full curtailment of the lower priority
category volumes to be accomplished before curtailment of any higher priority vol-
umes is commenced. Additionally, the above list requires both the direct and indi-
rect customers of the pipeline that use gas for similar purposes to be placed in the
same category of priority.
(4) The tariffs filed with this Commission should contain provisions that will re-
flect sufficient flexibility to permit pipeline companies to respond to emergency
situations (including environmental emergencies) during periods of curtailment
where supplemental deliveries are required to forestall irreparable injury to life or
property.
18 C.F.R. § 2.78(a) (1978).
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Subsequently the Commission passed order 467-C, which pro-
vides for relief from the rigid priority set out in order 467-B and
permits one who has a particularly appealing case to make his case
before the FPC.61
A case representative of one of those who might seek exception
to the general priority scheme is Texas Eastern Transmission
Corp .62 In that case the city of Lawrenceburg, Tennessee asked for
an allocation over and above that which it would have enjoyed
under the curtailment that had been in effect. It pointed out that
approximately 3500 people in the city were employed at a single
manufacturing plant. This plant depended upon natural gas to run
its boiler; under the allocation scheme it would have had to close
its boiler and thus the plant. The FPC ganted a larger allocation: in
view of the fact that Lawrenceburg was a town of only 10,000 and
was already severely depressed.
The early FPC allocations did not deal with intrastate pipelines,
61
Request for relief from curtailment shall be filed under § 1.7(b) of this chapter
and shall conform to the requirements of §§ 1.15 and 1.16 of this chapter. Those
petitions shall use the priorities set forth in (paragraph (a)(l), of this section) above,
the definitions contained in paragraph (b)(3) of this section and shall contain the
following minimal information:
(I) The specific amount of natural gas deliveries requested on peak .day and
monthly basis, and the type of contract under which the deliveries would be made.
(2) The estimated duration of the relief requested.
(3) A breakdown of all natural gas requirements on peak day and monthly bases
at the plant site by specific end-uses.
(4) The specific end-uses to which the natural gas requested will be utilized and
should also reflect the scheduling within each particular end-use with and without
the relief requested.
(5) The estimated peak day and monthly volumes of natural gas which would be
available with and without the relief requested from all sources of supply for the
period specified in the request.
(6) A description of existing alternate fuel capabilities on peak day and monthly
bases broken down by end-uses as shown in paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
(7) For the alternate fuels shown in paragraph (b)(5) of this section, provide a
description of the existing storage facilities and the amount of present fuel inven-
tory, names and addresses of existing alternate fuel suppliers, and anticipated de-
livery schedules for the period for which relief is sought.
(8) The current price per million Btu for natural gas supplies and alternate fuels
supplies.
(9) A description of efforts to secure natural gas and alternate fuels, including
documentation of contacts with the Federal Energy Office and any state or local
fuel allocation agencies or public utility commission.
(10) A description of all fuel conservation activities undertaken in the facility for
which relief is sought.
(11) If petitioner is a local natural gas distributor, a description of the currently
effective curtailment program and details regarding any flexibility which may be
available by effectuating additional curtailment to its existing industrial customers.
The distributor should also provide a breakdown of the estimated disposition of its
natural gas estimated to be available by end-use priorities established in paragraph
(a)(l) of this section for the period for which relief is sought.
18 C.F.R. § 2.78(b) (1978).
62 52 F.P.C. 1744 (1974).
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for they were not subject to the FPC's jurisdiction, nor did the FPC
purport to order allocations among pipelines.6 3 Recently Congress
has given the President the power under certain circumstances to
require the transfer of gas from one pipeline company to another
and from the intrastate to the interstate market in certain cir-
cumstances. 6 4 The President exercised the authority to allocate
among pipelines during the early part of 1977. Finally note that the
allocation to any particular retailer (utility) is dependent upon that
utility's report of the types of users. FPC Order 467-B directs "de-
liveries by jurisdictional pipeline companies"; it does not speak in
terms to the utilities. Thus it is conceivable that a state public ser-
vice commission could order a distribution different from the his-
toric distribution on which the allocation was based. Presumably
such distribution would then cause a change in the allocation under
467-B, but it is only indirectly that the FPC controls the ultimate
use to which the natural gas is put.
C. Petroleum Allocation
As the UCC cases discussed above show, 6 there were sporadic
shortages of gasoline at least as early as the summer of 1973. With
the imposition of the Arab Oil Embargo in the fall of 1973, it be-
came clear that the shortage would grow much more severe. Con-
gress hastily passed legislation to authorize allocation of petroleum
products; 7 the administration established a Federal Energy Office
which became the Federal Energy Administration, and ultimately
regulations on allocations were published. 68 The Emergency Pe-
troleum Allocation Act passed by Congress on November 27, 1973
63 In the words of John Nassikas, then Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, "[I]t
should be noted that the Commission does not have authority to compel interconnection and
deliveries between interstate pipeline companies .... The disposition of natural gas in intras-
tate commerce is subject to local authority, in most instances, exercised by the respective
State public utility commissions." Federal Preparedness to Deal with the U.S. Natural Gas
Shortage Emergency: Hearings Before a Sub-Committee of the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1975).
64 The Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977, § 4, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717(4) (West Supp. 1979),
vested the President with the power to order interstate pipelines to share supplies with one
another. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, §§ 301-303, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3361-3363 (West
Supp. 1979), expanded this power to include emergency purchases from interstate and in-
trastate pipelines to meet high-priority uses.
65 18 C.F.R. § 2.78(a)(2) (1978), which is quoted in full at note 58 supra.
66 See Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Terry v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 962, 140 Cal. Rptr. 510, 22 U.C.C. REP. 669 (1977).
67 Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760 (1976).
68 See Mandatory Petroleum Allocation Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 211 (1978).
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sets out a series of concerns 69 whose ultimate resolution could in-
volve some non-pro rata aspects. It essentially authorizes pro rata
allocation among all marketers and refiners based on the amount
each one bought in 1972.70 Here too the structure of the industry
arguably called for a particular scheme of allocation. Unlike the
natural gas industry, which is not fully integrated, the largest tradi-
tional gasoline and petroleum product sellers were involved in
every level of the industry. They were not only the drillers but also
the owners, transporters, wholesalers, and retailers. In recent
times unintegrated independents have grown up in every phase of
the industry, but the dominant persons in the market were the
large, highly integrated oil companies.7 1 Moreover, at least with
respect to gasoline purchases, the retail relationship in the natural
gas industry is quite different from that found in the petroleum in-
69 15 U.S.C. § 751(b) (1976) provides:
(a) The Congress hereby determines that-
(1) shortages of crude oil, residual fuel oil, and refined petroleum products
caused by inadequate domestic production, environmental constraints, and
the unavailability of imports sufficient to satisfy domestic demand, now exist
or are imminent;
(2) such shortages have created or will create severe economic dislocations
and hardships, including loss of jobs, closing of factories and businesses, re-
duction of crop plantings and harvesting, and curtailment of vital public ser-
vices, including the transportation of food and other essential goods; and
(3) such hardships and dislocations jeopardize the normal flow of commerce
and constitute a national energy crisis which is a threat to the public health,
safety, and welfare and can be averted or minimized most efficiently and effec-
tively through prompt action by the Executive branch of Government.
(b) The purpose of this chapter is to grant to the President of the United States
and direct him to exercise specific temporary authority to deal with shortages of
crude oil, residual fuel oil, and refined petroleum products or dislocations in their
national distribution system. The authority granted under this chapter shall be
exercised for the purpose of minimizing the adverse impacts of such shortages or
dislocations on the American people and the domestic economy.
70
(c)(l) To the extent practicable and consistent with the objectives of subsections (b)
and (d) of this section, the mandatory allocation program established under the regu-
lation under subsection (a) of this section shall be so structured as to result in the
allocation, during each period during which the regulation applies, of each refined
petroleum product to each branded independent marketer, each nonbranded inde-
pendent marketer, each small refiner and each independent refiner, and of crude oil to
each small refiner and each independent refiner, in an amount not less than the
amount sold or otherwise supplied to such marketer or refiner during the correspond-
ing period of 1972, adjusted to provide-
(A) in the case of refined petroleum products, a pro rata reduction in the
amount allocated to each person engaged in the marketing or distribution
of a refined petroleum product if the aggregate amount of such product
produced in and imported into the United States is less than the aggregate
amount produced and imported in calendar year 1972; and
(B) in the case of crude oil, a pro rata reduction in the amount of crude oil allo-
cated to each refiner if the aggregate amount produced in and imported into
the United States is less than the aggregate amount produced and imported
in calendar year 1972.
15 U.S.C. § 753(c)(1) (1976).
71 M. WILLRICH, supra note 54, at 111-19.
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dustry. A typical residential customer has a continuing relationship
with his gas utility; that same consumer might buy gasoline for his
automobile at a different station every time he fills his tank. Thus,
an allocation based upon end use but implemented one or two steps
away from the end use purchaser is possible in the natural gas in-
dustry, but it is not workable in the petroleum industry.
As ultimately promulgated, the regulations under section 753
contemplate primarily a pro rata scheme but with some priority
elements. For example, the regulation on gasoline allocation gives
first priority to agricultural production and to certain Department
of Defense uses. 72 Then it has a series of prorations, some based on
"current requirements," others based upon "base period use"
(presumably a lower amount than current requirements), and so
on.
7 3
IV. THE MODELS AND EXPERIENCE COMPARED
Consideration of the allocation schemes described above leaves
one with a variety of questions. How does one justify radically dif-
ferent allocation by federal agencies of similar commodities used
for similar purposes? Why is it so obviously right on the one hand
to give full priority to secured creditors and on the other to insist on
pro rata distribution among claimants under section 2-615? Unless
one can draw appropriate distinctions, either the Congress or the
FPC is wrong; either the system of priorities set out in Article 9 is
not justified or the assumption of pro rata distribution in section
2-615 is indefensible. We turn to those questions.
As a first step in determining which model should be used to
shape the allocation schemes under section 2-615, one should
analyze the reasons that caused the parties, the Congress, or the
72 10 C.F.R. § 211.103(b) (1978).
73 10 C.F.R. § 211.103(c) (1978) sets forth the categories of use assigned current or base
period requirements as follows:
(c) Allocation levels subject to an allocation fraction. (1) One hundred (100) percent of






(v) Passenger transportation services;
(vi) Cargo, freight and mail hauling by truck;
(vii) Aviation ground support vehicles and equipment.
(2) One hundred (100) percent of base period use (as reduced by application of the
allocation fraction) for the following uses:
(i) Industrial use;
(ii) Commercial use;
(iii) Governmental use; and
(iv) Social service agency use.
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various agencies to adopt the allocation schemes that they did
adopt.
Turning first to the Article 9 priority system, one sees that prior-
ity is necessary in any system in which the security interests are to
be recognized. Priority is the essence of security; without it one
does not have any security system. It is important, however, to
note certain aspects of the typical security system in order to un-
derstand why they might not be applicable to other circumstances.
First, in the typical Article 9 security arrangement, the allocator
(i.e., the debtor) is presumably no longer in business after the allo-
cation becomes effective. It has been dismembered by its secured
and unsecured creditors. Its long-term (post-allocation) interests
differ from those of one who expects to be in business after the
shortage ends and who has an interest in long-term retention of its
customers.
Second, the Article 9 scheme is the product of the common law
and statutory history in Anglo-American jurisprudence. It em-
bodies a complex and explicit set of notice requirements that are
designed to put those who would be subordinate on notice of their
subordinate position. Without such a scheme it would be unfair to
subordinate later parties. Hard experience has taught that a prior-
ity arrangement absent notice fosters collusive activity between
one party and the allocator against other parties.
74
What are the virtues and the vices of a first-in-time, first-in-right
priority allocation scheme? A fact conceived by some to be a vice,
but only dimly articulated in the cases, is the fact that some per-
sons who are later in time deal with the debtor without checking
notice files because of ignorance of the system; these persons are
still subordinated to earlier persons' claims. This fact is manifested
in the cases principally by a hostility to the secured parties' status
in some bankruptcy courts. 75 Those courts will be quick to strike
down a security interest or find it to be ineffective in competition
with unsecured creditors. A virtue of the system is that it unbun-
dles the various promises of the allocator. That is to say, the se-
cured creditor presumably charges a lower interest rate in return
for a first claim. Other lenders who do not enjoy such priority pre-
sumably charge higher interest rates for their unsecured credit. The
presence of the priority system makes possible separate bargaining
for the loan itself on the one hand and for the right to a first claim
7 See G. GILMORE, supra note 52, at 438-41, 462-80.
75 See, e.g., In re Raymond F. Sargent, Inc., 8 U.C.C. REP. 583 (D. Me. 1970); Coca-Cola
Bottling Plants, Inc. v. Tabenken, 7 U.C.C. REP. 565 (D. Me. 1970); In re Brawn, 6 U.C.C.
REP. 1031 (D. Me. 1969); Bank of North America v. Bank ofNutley, 94 N.J. Super. 220, 227
A.2d 535, 4 U.C.C. REP. 56 (1967); John Deere Co. v. William C. Pahl Construction Co., 59
Misc. 2d 872, 300 N.Y.S.2d 701, 6 U.C.C. REP. 840 (1969).
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on the other. If there were no such system, there could be no such
bargaining, and it is conceivable that all of the potential allocatees
would charge the higher rate, or that some of those who would lend
secured would chose not to lend at all.7 6At least this much is clear:
the abolition of a priority system would deprive the allocator of one
of the kinds of contracts that he is now free to make. Even under
the current system he has the power to make everyone share pro
rata by refusing to grant a security interest to any of his lenders.
We have seen that at common law the typical allocation scheme
in contract cases was a pro rata division of the available commod-
ity. The most significant difference between the Article 9 scheme
on the one hand and the common law or Article 2 scheme on the
other was pointed out by the court in Oakman 77where it referred to
the fact that the seller who was allocating had to remain in business
after the shortage. The court concluded that if the seller allocated
100% to certain buyers and nothing to others, seller would wipe out
its long-run business prospects. The court assumed that those who
received nothing would look elsewhere and would have memories
long enough to know that they should not deal with the seller after
the shortage was over. Of course it does not necessarily follow that
a buyer which is cut off will forsake its seller. It is conceivable that
it will simply bargain for greater priority after the shortage is over.
Nevertheless it seems likely that it is in the seller's long-term inter-
est to keep all of its customers as happy as possible and not to
make a small number very happy and a larger number very un-
happy. There are circumstances, however, under which it would
be in the seller's interest to allocate all to one and none to the rest.
For example, if a buyer had constructed his plant next to the sel-
ler's source of supply on the implicit understanding that the buyer
would take all or almost all of the output of that particular source,
other buyers from distant points could not argue that they had a
right to share in that source if they had never shared in it prior to
the shortage.
One should not dismiss the possibility that the common law pro
rata schemes are really an outgrowth of the trade practice in the
coal industry. As we have seen above, some of the early cases pur-
ported to be carrying out the trade practice. 78 The apparent adop-
tion of that rule by later cases and the comments in the Uniform
76 Of course it is also conceivable for some low-risk, wealthy debtors that security would
prove only to be the frosting on the cake and that secured lenders would continue to lend for
the same interest rate they would have charged on a secured loan.
77 Oakman v. Boyce, 100 Mass. 477, 480 (1868) (quoting trial judge's instructions to the
jury).
78 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Peninsular Portland Cement, 272 F. 625 (6th Cir. 1921);
McKeefrey v. Connellsville Coke & Iron Co., 56 F. 212 (3d Cir. 1893).
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Commercial Code may have elevated a trade practice that is not
necessarily the practice in all trades to the level of a rule of law.
The natural gas allocation offers yet another model. Like the Ar-
ticle 9 allocation scheme, it is a priority allocation method. Unlike
the Article 9 scheme, it is not based upon the allocatee's diligence
nor upon any individually negotiated right to a higher allocation. It
has come about by order of the FPC and is based on a judgment of
the social utility of giving 100% of the needs to one group while
withholding gas from others. In some ways the natural gas alloca-
tion scheme is the most interesting of all. Note that El Paso first
proposed what was essentially a pro rata scheme. 79 The FPC over-
ruled El Paso and its Rule 476-B set out a priority allocation
scheme. The motivation for that scheme was the belief that indi-
vidual home owners and certain other parties had to receive all of
their needs before others received any of their needs. That judg-
ment was based apparently on health considerations and also on
other value judgments about the relative efficiency of the natural
gas and alternative fuels' end uses.80 Doubtless the power of Con-
gress, responsive to the millions of votes of residential gas users,
was not lost on the FPC.
8 9
A priority allocation scheme not negotiated by the allocator but
dictated by a governmental agency lacks some of the virtues of a
negotiated scheme. Since the residential use goes to the top of the
list without paying anything extra for that right, the scheme does
not produce an unbundling or a possibility of direct negotiations for
the right to receive higher allocations. To the limited extent that the
allocation scheme gives higher priority to non-interruptible cus-
tomers,8 2 it offers the possibility of unbundling. The natural gas al-
location scheme interjects an additional question, namely who
should have the right to make the value judgments about the social
utility of various uses? Although allocations are sometimes made
by private parties on the basis of social utility,83 we commonly re-
serve such judgments to governmental officials such as the Con-
gress, the state legislatures, and the FPC. To what extent should
private parties be permitted such judgments?
19 El Paso Natural Gas Co., 48 F.P.C. 931 (1972).
80 See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
81 In the words of Professor Willrich, with "jobs, profits, lifestyles and votes at stake, it
seems inevitable as well as proper under the American form of government that administra-
tion of a serious energy shortage will be a highly politicized process from beginning to end."
M. WILLRICH, supra note 54, at 3 (1976).
82 18 C.F.R. § 2.78(a)(i)(i)-(v) (1978).
83 Several of my respondents in interviews in the chemical industry reported specific allo-
cations to certain buyers based upon judgments about social utility. For example, two sellers
of chlorine reported that they had given more than pro rata allocations to municipalities for
use in water purification.
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Finally there are the petroleum allocations, which, unlike the
natural gas scheme, are pro rata allocations at -the resale level.
Here it appears that the motivation on the part of the Administra-
tion and the Congress was to protect independent sellers. 84 Con-
gress feared that the integrated oil companies would cut off the in-
dependent wholesalers and retailers in order more effectively to
control the market after the shortage had passed. It was apparently
the judgment of the Administration and the Congress that such in-
dependents were an important source of competition in non-
shortage times and that they should be protected.15 The federal
agencies, like the common law contract sellers, looked beyond the
shortage to the market that will exist after the shortage in order to
shape the allocation scheme. Unlike the common law case, how-
ever, the pro rata rule is here not dictated by the interest of the
seller-whose interest might be the converse-but by a social
judgment that independent wholesalers and retailers of gasoline
serve a useful social purpose and should be protected.
Other allocation plans could be used, but are commonly rejected
by contract sellers. The first is a "delay model," under which the
seller does not discharge its full obligation by a pro rata allocation,
but simply extends the time under its contract. The seller thus
8' Frank Zarb, Administrator for the Federal Energy Administration, outlined the general
thrust of the petroleum allocation regulation as follows:
There are three primary programs by which crude oil is allocated under the Man-
datory Petroleum Allocation Regulations. First, domestic crude oil supply relation-
ships existing on December 1, 1973 have been frozen to ensure continuing supplies
to small and independent refiners and to provide a supply base for calculation of
buy/sell list amounts. Second, an allocation program, known as the buy-sell pro-
gram, has been established among refiners to provide access to crude oil supplies
for small and independent refiners. This program is generally designed to protect
the competitive viability of small and independent refiners and to assure adequate
supplies of refimed products in all geographic regions on an equitable basis.
Third, the entitlements program is designed to provide all refiners with equal ac-
cess to low priced domestic old crude oil to mitigate widely divergent feedstock
costs among refiners resulting from the two tier price system.
Oversight - Federal Energy Administration Programs: Hearings Pursuant to Senate Resol-
ution 45 Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
519 (1975). The policy goal with respect to independent refiners and sellers is set forth by
Congress in 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(lXD) (1976).
85
The acute shortages of some petroleum products in December 1973, and January
and February 1974, caused the program to be oriented initially toward avoiding re-
gional unequity [sic] in supplies. The shortage hit hardest regions supplied heavily
by independents. Soon, however, the primary objective of regulation seems to
have become protection of the independent sector of the industry. [William] Simon
is said to have been a key supporter of that objective. Thus a severe petroleum
shortage provided the immediate impetus for launching a massive regulatory pro-
gram which quickly became justified in terms of much longer range policy
concerns-namely, preservation of the petroleum industry structure.
M. WILLRICH, supra note 54, at 180-81. Cf. Alexander, How Little Oil Hit a Gusher on
Capitol Hill, FORTUNE, Aug. 14, 1978, at 149 (for a discussion of how Congress' entitlement
subsidy to small refineries has caused a boom in the construction of the smaller and more
inefficient plants). HeinOnline  -- 12 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 526 1978-1979
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makes full, albeit delayed, deliveries over a longer period of time.
Such a method differs from the pro rata allocation method in that it
requires the seller to deliver the full quantity at the contract price
and deprives it of the right of satisfying its full obligation with a les-
ser quantity at the contract price and of charging a higher price for
subsequent deliveries. Sellers commonly reject the "delay model"
as conflicting with both their long- and short-term interests. They
wiselyfear the loss of the angered buyers after the shortage has
passed. In the short term, sellers must deliver larger amounts at the
lower prices that prevailed before the shortage, as opposed to satis-
fying their pre-shortage obligations fully and then delivering under
new contracts at higher prices later.
A priority scheme based upon some judgment about the social
utility of the various users is also likely to conflict with both the
seller's long- and short-term interests. Presumably in the agreed
priority arrangement, the seller is able to acquire a premium from
one buyer in return for the promise to give it everything before the
seller gives anything to another. If this allocation has been made
not on the basis of the agreement but on the basis of the social util-
ity of certain uses, the seller may find itself selling not only to its
lowest priced buyers but also aggravating its best customers and so
frustrating both its long- and short-term interest.
The last model commonly rejected by sellers is one that would
require a complete revamping of our judgments about section 2-615
itself. This might be called the price allocation model. One might
change the law so that a rise in costs would free a seller from its
contract obligations much more readily than is now the case under
section 2-615(a). So freed, the seller would be free to raise prices to
the level at which the supply offsets demand. The seller would al-
locate the scarce resource to those who were able and prepared to
pay the highest price. This model will seldom apply under current
law for two reasons. First, section 2-615(b) explicitly rejects it
when the seller has some of the contracted-for commodity. What-
ever "fair and reasonable" means, clearly it does not include auc-
tioning the goods to tlose who will pay the highest price. In other
cases where the seller may have sufficient supply to meet contract
obligations but where costs have radically increased, the courts
have generally refused to find commercial impracticability and thus
have rejected the seller's argument that it is free from its contract
obligations under section 2-615(a).
8 6
86 Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 3 U.C.C. REP. 401 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 3 U.C.C. REP. 372 (2d Cir.
1966); Deardorff-Jackson Co. v. National Produce Distributors, Inc., 26 A.D. 1309, 4
U.C.C. REP. 1164 (Agric. Dec. 1967); Security Sewage Equipment v. McFerren, 14 Ohio St.
2d 251, 237 N.E.2d 898, 5 U.C.C. REP. 495 (1968).
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A second reason of equal or greater importance for rejecting the
price rise option is the damage it will do to the seller's long-term
interests. In my studies of contracting in the chemical industry, re-
spondents frequently stated the belief that there was something
improper and immoral about raising one's price to take advantage
of a shortage. The people who are so outraged would, in most cir-
cumstances, respond by reducing their purchases from the seller
after the shortage. The seller which raised its prices to what others
regarded as immoral levels would thus suffer a long-term sales de-
cline.
Putting aside many unique situations and ignoring qualifications,
one generally concludes that sellers use and favor pro rata distribu-
tion methods not because the law says they must or because trade
practice suggests that such methods are appropriate, but because it
is in their long- and short-term interest normally to do so.
To what extent under section 2-615 should a court either mandate
a pro rata system or order a non-pro rata scheme? A principal les-
son from the experience of the past ten years and from the common
law cases before that time is that it should be a rare case when the
courts do either. In the last ten years we have seen different federal
agencies come to different conclusions about allocations of similar
energy resources. Given that federal diversity, how can one argue
as a general proposition that a private seller is acting in an unrea-
sonable manner if it uses proration rather than a priority system?
That experience suggests that, at a minimum, a seller needs some
latitude based on the circumstances in its trade.
A second reason for judicial abstention is that court monitoring
of an allocation system is likely to cost much but produce little.
Consider a large chemical company that is allocating hundreds of
products to thousands of buyers on thousands of different con-
tracts under tens of thousands of different delivery dates and
terms. The company itself may not know the extent to which its
employees are following the plan. Clearly judicial inquiry into the
operation of such a plan would be costly, too costly in my judgment
to be justified by the correction of an occasional wrong.
Third, there is good reason to believe that the market itself will
punish inappropriate behavior. Certainly that was the belief and
the intention of the parties in the chemical trade. The moral indig-
nation of the consumer over "price gouging" is substantial; no ra-
tional seller can ignore it. The long-term interest of the seller in re-
taining his customers will almost always temper outrageous be-
havior during a shortage.
There is at least one case in which it is appropriate for the court
to impose a pro rata system in the face of an agreed priority sys-
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tem. That is the case in which the seller has failed by its behavior or
by explicit notice to make others aware that it has agreed to favor
one buyer over another. Article 9 tells us that we need notice of
any agreed priority and that it would be unfair to other buyers who
purchased without notice of such an agreement to allow it to be
carried out.
Conversely, if there was an agreement for priority and that
agreement was adequately communicated to the other parties,
should the court not enforce such an agreement? I believe that the
court should. If, for example, a buyer of a chemical product builds
its plant next door to the seller's plant under the implicit assurance
that the buyer will take the entire output of that plant, I would
argue that there is a priority allocation scheme and that the seller
should be ordered to make deliveries to the buyer to the exclusion
of others.
V. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the common law cases and those under section
2-615, and a comparison of other allocation schemes dictated by
the government or authorized by the Code tells us several things.
First, it demonstrates that a contract seller will normally use some
form of pro rata allocation scheme. It is in the seller's interest to do
so and is normally not unfair to other parties to have that happen.
Second, this history tells us that almost all pro rata schemes con-
tain some deviation, for there is need for flexibility to recognize
buyers with particular needs and demands. Third, the history
suggests that most systems have certain self-policing methods, and
are built on an extraordinarily complex structure of acts, contracts,
and assumptions. Thus, courts should only rarely and in the most
egregious case act to overturn an allocation scheme.
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